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SOME COMMENTS ON THE RIGHT OF AN EMPLOYER
TO GO OUT OF BUSINESS: THE DARLINGTON CASE
[The following is a discussion of the significance and/or impact
of the recently decided Darlington Mfg. Co. case as seen by labor and
management. Robert M. Segal, Esquire maintains that the decision
represents a legitimate restriction on an employer's right to go out of
business in the face of union activity. John E. Teagan, Esquire be-
lieves that an employer should be allowed to cease operations, even
where partially motivated by union demands, where there is separate
economic justification for such a decision.
THE RESTRICTION
ROBERT M. SEGAL *
The decision by the National Labor Relations Board in Darlington
Mfg. Co.,' raises some fundamental questions concerning an employer's
supposed absolute right to close his plant permanently, discharge his
employees and cease doing business. According to the Board, Congress
by the Labor-Management Relations Law of 1947 2 has deprived the
employer of his right to close his plant and discharge employees for
engaging in protected activities. Withdrawal of this right is absolute
and unequivocal. Furthermore, the Board has in this case fashioned
some interesting remedies to protect the rights of the employees. The
case involves the basic issue whether termination of employment in the
face of union demands and activities itself violates the employees' rights
guaranteed by section 7 and therefore constitutes interference and dis-
crimination proscribed by sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the act.
The decision was almost six years in the making and involved one
intermediate and two supplemental intermediate reports by an NLRB
trial examiner, a decision by a federal district court enjoining a remand
of the case to the trial examiner, a decision by a federal court of appeals
modifying the district court decision and finally three opinions by the
five-member Board. Currently, the case is before the court of appeals
for review of the NLRB decision.
The facts of the case are relatively simple. At a Board conducted
election on September 6, 1956, the union won by a vote of 256 to 248 and
was certified as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for the em-
ployees on October 24, 1956. In the interim, the stockholders voted to
close the mill and liquidate its operations "because of certain develop-
ments" (i.e., "the recent election where the majority of the people in the
* Senior partner of Segal Sr Flamm of Boston; former chairman of Labor Relations
Law Section of American Bar Association ; co-chairman of Labor-Management Relations
Committee of Boston Bar Association.
1 139 N.L.R,B. No. 23, 51 L.R.R,M. 1278 (1962).
2 61 Stat. 136-58 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1958).
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plant . . . [were] . . . for the union"). The liquidation was there-
after carried out, the equipment and plant machinery were sold at auc-
tion and approximately 500 employees lost their jobs. In answering the
union's unfair labor charges, the company claimed that the closing of
the mill was caused by six economic and financial factors, but also
contended that "as an employer it had an absolute right to go out of
business for whatever reason it may choose and regardless whether
union animosity may have contributed to the decision."
The National Labor Relations Board found that the company had
violated the act, and held that a plant closing resulting in the discharge
of employees that is even partly caused by their union activities is an
unfair labor practice. This is true, the Board holds, even though there
were six genuine economic factors which also motivated the shutdown.
As to the employer's absolute right to go out of business, the Board holds
that section 8 (a) (3) prohibits an employer from closing his plant in
retaliation for the employees' selection of a union as bargaining agent.
The Board says that if one of the employer's purposes is to avoid dealing
with a union certified as the employees' bargaining agent and to retaliate
against employees for their union activities, the closing of the plant and
the discharges amount to unlawful interference and discrimination under
the act.
The Board's remedy in this case is a broad one, for its order applies
to both the Darlington Manufacturing Company and the parent Deering
Milliken & Co. It finds that common ownership and common control
of labor relations and operations make the parent corporation and
its mills a "single employer" for the purposes of the act. On the other
hand, no individual liability is imposed on the company's president.
Dissents were entered by Board members Rodgers and Leedom.
The latter agrees with the unfair labor practice findings of the majority
but would limit liability to the Darlington Company, and would allow
back pay only from the date of discharge to the date of the plant's clos-
ing. Member Rodgers would find a violation of 8(a) (1) against the
Darlington Company, based on interrogation of the employees and
threatening statements, but would dismiss all other charges on the
ground that "there is nothing in the basic Act nor in any amendments
thereto which limits an employer's right to go out of business at such
time and under such circumstances as he chooses."
Section 8 (a) (1) proscribes interference, coercion and restraint of
employees in the rights guaranteed by section 7 of the act. Violations of
this section can be generally classified as follows:
(1) Any conduct which has no independent business significance
and is intended to discourage union organization or influence the em-
ployees' choice of representatives violates section 8 (a) (1) unless it is
privileged as speech under section 8(c).
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(2) Conduct which has independent business significance but
which is undertaken for the purpose of discouraging unionization or
influencing the choice of employees violates section 8 (a) (1). Actions
such as the granting or timing of a wage increase,' the closing of a de-
partment or removal of a plant, 4
 or the subcontracting of work' would
be unlawful under 8 (a) (1) if undertaken for the purpose of discourag-
ing union activity. Although there seems to be no dispute about the
validity of the legal principle involved, courts have been rather quick to
reverse findings that given conduct was directed against union activity
as a matter of fact.°
(3) Conduct which is an undue interference with organizational
activities, because the business justification is insufficient, has also been
held to be a violation of section 8 (a) (1). 7 When discharges are involved
in the above cases, section 8 (a) (3), which prohibits discrimination
against employees because of union activities, is also involved.
In Darlington the majority held that section 8 (a) (3), not section
8(a) (1), literally proscribed the employer's closing of its business in
retaliation for the employees' selection of the union. Further, refusal to
bargain with the union violated section 8 (a) (5).
Darlington is not the first case to limit sharply the so-called
management prerogatives in this area. It has long been settled that it is
illegal for an employer to escape his bargaining obligation or to retaliate
against his employees for their union activities by shutting down a de-
partment of his business completely, 8
 contracting out part of his work,'
moving his plant from one location to another," or shutting down
temporarily." In all of these cases, the employers divested themselves
only of some of their operations but did not go completely out of business.
A whole series of cases had been decided relative to temporary
shutdowns. If the Board finds that they are used by an employer to
3
 Hudson Hosiery Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1947) ; May Dept. Stores Co. v. NLRB,
326 U.S. 375 (1945). These may also be per se violations.
4 Industrial Fabricating Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 41 L.R.R.M. 1038 (1957).
5
 R. C. Mahon Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1537, 40 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1957). These may also
be per se violations.
6 Mt. Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954) ; NLRB v. Houston
Chronicle Pub. Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954) ; NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226
F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955).
7
 NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Co., 167 F.2d 147 (1948) ; In the Matter of
Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 12 L.R.R.M. 183 (1943).
8 See, e.g., Williams Motor Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1942) ; NLRB v.
Wallick & Schwalam Co., 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952).
9
 See, e.g., NLRB v. Brown-Dunkin Co., 287 F.2d 17 (10th Or. 1961), Inforcing
125 N.L.R.B. 1379, 45 L.R.R.M. 1526 (1959).
10 See, e.g., Rome Prods., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217, 22 L.R.R.M. 1138 (1948) ;
Tool Co. v. NLRB, 51 L.R.R.M. 2595 (2d Cir. 1962); enforcing 135 N.L.R.B. No. 87,
49 L.R.R.M. 1485 (1962).
11 See, e.g., NLRB v. Joseph Stremel, d/b/a Crow Bar Coal Co., 141 F.2d 317
(10th Cir. 1944) ; NLRB v. Somerset Classics, 193 F.2d 613 (2d Cir,), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 816 (1952) ; Norma Mining Corp, v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1953).
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retaliate against union activities (i.e., a strike threat) or to gain a
bargaining advantage, it has normally held them to be unlawful and a
form of interference under 8(a) (1), and no different from any other
form of discrimination violative of section 8(a) (3 ) .' 2 However, the.
"whipsaw" lockout defense has been held valid where the non-struck
members of a multi-employer unit temporarily shut down or lockout
employees when one of its members is struck "to preserve the multi-
employer bargaining basis from the disintegration threatened by the
union's strike action."" At the same time, the Board has recently held
that the non-struck employer could not continue operations by resorting
to replacements, and that such a temporary whipsaw lockout of his
employees violates sections 8 (a) (1) and (3 )." The circuit courts have
split on the issue whether an employer may temporarily lock out his
employees in order to enhance his bargaining position." The Board has
justified temporary lockouts as valid defensive measures in the follow-
ing cases: (1) Where the timing of the threatened strike would result
in a spoilage of materials; 16 (2) where recurrent work stoppages
threaten the employer's ability to plan production schedules; 17 (3) •
where the union had threatened to strike, had previously engaged in
"quickie" strikes, and had refused to give requested assurances prevent-
ing substantial loss and serious danger to the health and safety of the
public; " (4) where the shutdown is necessary to avoid unusual loss
or business disruption attendant upon a strike." At the same time
multi-employer agreements "or mutual aid pacts" to suspend operations
in an association-wide unit have recently been upheld by the Board in the
Publishers Ass'n of N .Y . case." Similarly, the railroads' strike insurance
plan was found lawful under the Railway Labor Act by Judge Ryan in
12 See Utah Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 165 (10th
Cir. 1961) ; Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 917 (1959). Compare NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886
(5th Cir. 1962).
13 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449 (Buffalo Linen Supply Co.), 353 U.S. 87
{1957) ; see Meltzer, Single Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts under Taft-Hartley
Act, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 70 (1955).
14 Brown Food Store, 137 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 50 L.R.R.M. 1046 (1962).
15 The Board was sustained by the Third and Tenth Circuits, Quaker State Oil Ref.
Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 12; Utah Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB,
supra note 12; but not by the Fifth Circuit, NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., supra
note 12. This question was left open in NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, supra note
13.
lo Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335, 12 L.R.R.M. 151 (1943).
17 International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907, 27 L.R.R.M. 1504 (1951).
18 Building Contractors Ass'n of Rockford, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 51 L.R.R.M.
1211 (1962). See also Associated Gen. Contractors, Ga. Branch, 138 N.L.R.B. No. 144,
51 L.R.R.M. 1215 (1962).
19 Betts Cadillac-Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268, 128 L.R.R.M. 1509 (1951).
20 139 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 51 L.R.R.M. 1434 (1962). See Clune v. Publishers' Ass'n
of N.Y.C., 52 L.R.R.M. 2437 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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Kennedy v. Long Island R.R. Co.,' even though the insurance may have
assisted a struck railroad in resisting the union's demands during nego-
tiations.
The Darlington case, then, is another in a series of Board and court
decisions which definitely restricts management's "rights" of unilateral
action. A decision to subcontract work clone by employees who are
members of a bargaining unit represented by a union has already been
held to be a mandatory subject of bargaining. It does not matter that
the employer is motivated solely by economic considerations, and it is
not necessary for the union to have a contract with the employer." As
the Board pointed out in Town & Country 111 f g..Co.
The duty to bargain about a decision to subcontract work does
not impose an undue or unfair burden upon the employer
involved. This obligation to bargain in nowise restrains an
employer from formulating or effectuating an economic deci-
sion to terminate a phase of his business operations. Nor does it
obligate him to yield to a union's demand that a subcontract
not be let, or that it be let on terms inconsistent with manage-
ment's business judgment. Experience has shown, however,
that candid discussion of mutual problems by labor and
management frequently results in their resolution with at-
tendant benefit to both sides. Business operations may profit-
ably continue and jobs may be preserved. Such prior dis-
cussion with a duly designated bargaining representative
is all that the Act contemplates. But it commands no less.'
Where there is a union contract in existence, the courts and arbitra-
tors have awarded damages against violations of runaway shop provi-
sions.' In addition, an employer's decision to subcontract may well be
subject to court ordered arbitration in a section 301 suit under the
Trilogy decisions of the Supreme Court." In arbitration, the decisions
21 51 L.R.R.M. 2704 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
22 Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. No. 111, 49 L.R.R.M. 1918 (1962).
The Board reasoned that the most meaningful way to remedy the wrong would be to
require the company to reinstitute its trucking operations, to reinstate the discharged
drivers with back pay and to bargain with the union. See also Fibreboard Paper Prods.,
138 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 51 L.R.R.M. 1101 (1962) and Adams Dairy Inc., 137 N.L.R.B,
No. 87 (1962).
23 The Board has recently applied the Town & Country principle to the employer's
termination of its entire business in Star Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 52 L.R.R.M.
1094 (1963). For an early case requiring bargaining over subcontracting, see Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 18 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1946).
24 Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd
and rev'd in part, 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962) ; Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162
Misc. 177, 292 N.Y. Supp. 898 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; Sidele Fashions Inc., 36 Lab. Arb. 1364
(Dash. 1961) ; Address-O-Mat, Inc., 36 Lab. Arb. 1074 (Wolff 1961).
26 Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) ; and Steelworkers v. American
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on the merits have been diverse, for although some arbitrators have
stressed the reserved right of management to subcontract, many have
held that this right is not unlimited." Then, a firm can be compelled to
arbitrate questions concerning the effect of consolidation on an existing
contract and on the rights of its employees under the contract."
After the expiration of a union contract, the employer may still be
faced with many legal problems relative to the union and its members.
He may not unilaterally change the terms and conditions of employment
unless an impasse has in fact been reached.28
 An arbitrator's award for
reinstatement and back pay may well be enforced by the court after
the contract term," and an employer may have to pay accrued severance
pay, vacation and pensions even if he has gone out of business." Further-
more, he may be confronted with employee seniority and job rights after
he has moved his plant with no unfair labor practices involved."
During negotiations with a union (or even during a contract term
in some cases), the employer must disclose information which the union
needs for bargaining purposes" and also bargain over merit increases,'
stock bonuses, insurance' and pensions 38
 and such other mandatory
subjects of bargaining as are encompassed within the general terms
"wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment." In spite of
the literal language of section 8 (e) of the act, the employer must bargain
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). See also Montgomery Ward Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. No. 41,
51 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1962).
26 See Matter of Celanese Corp., 33 Lab, Arb. 925 (1960) ; Crawford, The Arbitra-
tion of Disputes over Subcontracting in Challenges to Arbitration (BNA 1960). At the
same time, the courts have enforced arbitration awards ordering the company to bring
back its "runaway" shops.
27 Livingston v. Wiley & Sons, Inc., 52 L.R.R.M. 2223 (2d Cir. 1963).
28
 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) ; NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477
(1960) ; Note, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 416 (1962) ; Note, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 666 (1962).
2fl United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra note 25.
30
 Brooklyn Eagle Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. 156 (1959) ; Owens v. Press Publishing Co.,
20 N.J. 537, 120 A.2d 442 (1956).
31
 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), 52 L.R.R.M. 2764 (1963) ; cf.
Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Aaron, Reflections on the
Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532 (1962) ; Note,
38 U. of Det. L.J. 389 (1961) ; Note, 71 Yale L.J. 563 (1962) ; Note, 48 Va. L. Rev. 291
(1961). See also Giordano v. Mack Trucks Inc., 49 L.R.R.M. 3082 (D.C. N.J. 1960) ; System
Fed'n No. 59 v. La. & A. Ry., 119 F.2d 509 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 314 U.S. 656 (1941) ;
Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 952 (1963).
32 Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856, 35 L.R.R.M. 1150 (1954), aff'd, 351 U.S. 149
(1956). Limitations have recently been imposed in Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B.
No. 145, 50 L.R.R.M. 1061 (1962) and Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 132 N.L.R.B. 1660,
48 L.R.R.M. 1544 (1961).
33 NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 335 U.S. 814
(1948).
34 NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
35 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
960 (1949).
88 See Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by NLRB, 63 Harv. L.
Rev. 389 (1950) ; Cox, Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401 (1958).
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over the normal subcontract clauses." Under the Railway Labor Act
the Supreme Court, by a five to four decision," has held that the carrier
must bargain over a union's request that no position in existence on a
certain date should be abolished or discontinued except by agreement
between the carrier and the union; the Court stated:
The employment of many of these station agents inescapably
hangs on the number of railroad stations that will be either
completely abandoned or consolidated with other stations.
And, in the collective bargaining world today, there is nothing
strange about agreements that affect the permanency of em-
ployment."
Indeed the Board has gone a long way in regulating not only the terms
of collective bargaining but also the methods of collective bargaining by
the parties." As the General Counsel pointed out in his summary of
operations for the calendar year 1962,
An area of significant development in 1962 affecting OGC
practice in investigation and case handling was that relating
to the requirement of consultation between labor and manage-
ment over economic issues which affect employees' job secu-
rity. Such economic decisions include subcontracting, con-
tracting out, plant removal, termination of facilities, and sale
of a business, or the complete going out of business. In times
of intensifying market competition and increasing costs, these
problems have come to the fore. This is not a matter of NLRB
decision alone but has manifested itself in Supreme Court and
Appellate Court decisions under the NLRA, the Railway
Labor Act, and under general law. It is not confined to any one
sector of labor law development, and even private collective
bargaining arrangements of national interest have had their
relevancy."
The basic principles of the Darlington case, therefore, are not new.
As the General Counsel also stated in his Annual Report,
Both the Board and the Courts have long established the il-
legality of so-called 'run-away plants.' In other words, it is
illegal for an employer to move his plant from one location to
another and to reopen it there with different employees in
order to escape his obligation to bargain with a union which
37 Cox, Landrum-Griffin Amendments to NLRA, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 257, 270 (1959).
38 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
39 Id. at 336.
49 Cox & Dunlop, supra note 36; C.E.D., The Public Interest in National Labor
Policy 81-85 (1961).
41 Office of the General Counsel, Summary of Operations 122 (1962).
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has been selected as the bargaining representative by a ma-
jority of his employees. Similarly, it has been held illegal for
an employer to shut down a department of his business in
order to escape his bargaining obligation, or to contract out
part of his work for this purpose, whether this is done by sub-
contracting the work to another employer or by converting
the status of his employees to that of independent contrac-
tors .42
Prior to the Darlington case, the decisions involving plant shut-
downs under the act had turned primarily on the question whether the
shutdown was motivated by economic reasons, or by a desire to avoid
bargaining with a union or to retaliate against the employees for their
union activities. In the Mt. Hope Finishing Co. case," the NLRB found
that the company's actions were unlawfully motivated, but the court of
appeals found that the shutdown and partial removal were based on
economic factors and gave due weight to "the unfavorable economic
conditions which for years have confronted the textile industry in New
England." In New Madrid M g. Co.," the court of appeals at St. Louis
had refused to extend remedial liability beyond the date of the per-
manent shutdown of the plant or the sale of the business. There the
court stated that nothing in the act deprives an employer of his absolute
right to close his plant permanently and cease doing business for what-
ever reason he may choose.
The majority in Darlington recognized that in the New Madrid
case the court of appeals had said that an employer has "the absolute
right, at all times, to permanently close and go out of business, or to
actually dispose of his business to another, for whatever reason he may
choose, whether union animosity or anything else," and "No one can be
required to stay in private business and no one can be prevented from
permanently closing or abdicatingly selling such a business." 45 At the
same time the Board pointed out that the court in that case actually
agreed with the Board's finding that New Madrid's shutdown of the
plant for discriminatory reasons violated sections 8 (a) (1), (3) and (5)
of the act, and that the court merely held that the company's liability
for this unfair labor practice did not extend beyond its actual and
permanent closing or true and bona fide change in ownership of the
business.
In the Darlington case, the Board rejected the claim of an "absolute
right of an employer to close his plant and discharge his employees for
whatever reason he may choose." The Board regards the statements in
42 Id. at 123.
43 Mt. Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, supra note 6.
44 NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1954).
45 Id. at 914.
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the New Madrid case as mere dictum and contrary to the actual holding,
for it stated:
Accordingly, the legal conclusions that the Court reached were
contrary to the court's obiter dictum that an employer can
permanently close a business for whatever reason he may
choose, whether union animosity or anything else.' The Court
found that New Madrid's mill shutdown with its concomitant
discharge of employees violated Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
Indeed, the Court issued an order requiring the reinstatement
of the discharged employees; such reinstatement order could
be made only in the case of unlawful discharge. Moreover,
Darlington's interpretation of the Eighth Circuit's decision
attributes to the Court the overruling of its own earlier deci-
sions, even though the statutory right of an employer to close
a plant permanently was not in issue and was not briefed by
any party.
In the circumstances we are loath to accept the Respond-
ent's interpretation of the Circuit Court's intendment in the
New Madrid case. We view the above-quoted paragraph as
part of the Court's concern with the remedy in a case wherein
the Court otherwise found that New Madrid, in a bona fide
transaction, sold its plant to Jones. In any event, if Darlington
has correctly interpreted the Court's meaning, we respectfully
disagree."
In its decision on section 8 (a) (3), the Board relied on several
court decisions involving violations of the act. It cited the Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp.," where it was
held that an employer violated section 8 (a) (3) by the wholesale
discharge of its employees because they were members of a particular
union. There the Court stated that "employees . . . have a right
guaranteed by the Act that they will not be dismissed because of affilia-
tion with a particular union." It cited a decision of the - Fourth Circuit
which found that an employer violated sections 8(a) (1) and (3) by
shutting its mine after threatening to do so because of his employees'
union activities." It noted its own decision relative to subcontracting
in Town & Country" and also noted the Crow Bar Coal case," where
the court stated, "A shutdown or lock-out of employees for the purpose
of discouraging membership in a labor organization constitutes dis-
crimination within Section 8(3) and (1) of the Act." It cited the Third
46 51 L.R.R.M. at 1282.
47 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
48 NLRB v. Norma Mining Corp., 206 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1953).
4D supra note 22.
5° NLRB v. Joseph Stremel d/b/a Crow Bar Coal Co., supra note 11, at 318.
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Circuit's decision" which held that an employer which closed one of its
plants because of opposition to its employees' union activities violated
section 8(a) ( 1 ), (3) and (5). It also cited the Eighth Circuit's uphold-
ing of the finding that an employer which discontinued one of its depart-
ments in retaliation for its employees' activities in behalf of a union
violated section 8 (a) (3)."
The Board concluded that "in summary, Section 8(a) (3) literally
proscribes Darlington's closing of its business in retaliation for the em-
ployees' selection of the Union as their bargaining representative. .. .
Congress has taken from employers the right to discharge employees for
engaging in protected activities. The withdrawal of this right is absolute
and unequivocal." 53
Member Rodgers dissented and stated, "For—constitutional issues
aside—there is nothing contained in the basic Act nor in any amend-
ment thereto which limits an employer's right to go out of business at
such times and under such circumstances as he chooses."
Mention should be made of the broad remedies involved in the case
insofar as they bear on the effects of going out of business. In order to
restore the situation here as nearly as possible to that which would have
obtained but for the illegal discrimination, not only was back pay
awarded from the date of the discriminatory discharges to the date when
the employees would be able to obtain substantially equivalent employ-
ment, but the parent company (which was considered with Darlington
as a single employer) was also ordered to offer reemployment to the dis-
charged employees without prejudice to their seniority and other rights
and privileges in the event Darlington did not reopen its plant. Further,
these discharged employees were ordered placed on a preferential hiring
list by the parent company, which was also ordered to pay travel and
moving expenses. Precedent for this order was found in previous Board
decisions.54 The Board also ordered the parent company to bargain with
the union concerning the preferential hiring lists and the terms and con-
ditions under which the discharged employees of Darlington might
obtain employment in the company's other mills in South Carolina and
adjacent states. The Board, relying on several prior decisions," also
ordered the employer to mail copies of the Board notices to the em-
ployees involved, and to publish those notices in the local newspapers
51 NLRB v. Wallick & Schwalam Co., supra note 8.
52
 Williams Motor Co. v. NLRB, supra note 8.
53 51 L.R.R.M. at 1282.
54 Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 48 L.R.R.M. 1679 (1961), enforced,
305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962). In this case the employer was found to have violated the
act by moving his plant and discharging his employees in order to force the union to
accept his bargaining proposals. Among other remedies the Board ordered the employer
to offer the discharged employees reinstatement at the new location, and also ordered
him to offer to pay their travel and moving expenses.
55 Southland Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 813, 28 L.R.R.M. 1104 (1951) ; NLRB v.
American Laundry Mach. Co., 152 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1946).
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weekly for eight weeks. Thus the consequences of going out of business
may well turn out to be serious for the Darlington Company and its
parent corporation."
At the same time, several court decisions may prove troublesome
to the Board in enforcing its order in the Darlington case. In Yoseph
Bag Co.," the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the case
in order to determine, among other factors, whether the employer had
decided to go out of business before or after the employees were dis-
charged. The court noted that "if the decision to discontinue operations
permanently . . . was made after . . . [the date of the discharges],
the Company's acts . . of refusing to bargain, and discharging its
employees were unfair labor practices . . . even if the Company even-
tually decided to go out of business completely and permanently. . . ."
But the court indicated that a different situation might be presented if
the decision to close permanently was made before or simultaneously
with the discharges; it declined to decide whether such a shutdown
would constitute a violation "without more complete findings of fact by
the Board and a clearer indication of the precise nature of its decision.""
In New Madrid the court had refused to enforce liability beyond the
company's "actual and permanent closing or true and bona fide change
in ownership" of the business, and in the Mt. Hope case,' the court was
quick to find economic reasons for the plant removal. Even in subcon-
tracting cases, the principal issue had been the employer's motives in
making the change, and in the Houston Chronicle Publishing case," the
court of appeals reversed the Board after finding that the evidence did
not support the Board's holding that the employer changed to an inde-
pendent-contractor arrangement for discriminatory reasons. In the
Adkins case," the court in effect said that the Board must prove that the
primary or substantial cause of the removal was an anti-union motive.
The courts have also refused to enforce Board orders in plant removal
cases where some plausible economic reasons can be established."
59 For slightly modified remedies used by the Board in more recent cases, see Myers
Ceramic Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 51 L.R.R.M. 1605 (1962); Star Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
No. 67, 52 L.R.R.M. 1094 (1963).
57 M. Yoseph Bag Co. v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1962), remanding 128
N.L.R.B. 211, 46 L.R.R.M. 1279 (1962). On remand the Board held that the discharges
antedated the employer's decision to discontinue operations and thereby eliminated the
Darlington issue. M. Yoseph Bag Co., 139 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 51 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1962).
56 294 F.2d at 369-70.
59 Mt. Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, supra note 6, setting aside 106 N.L.R.B. 480
(1953).
99 NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., supra note 6; see also NLRB v. New
England Web, Inc., 51 L.R.R.M. 2426 (1st Cir. 1962).
61 NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., supra note 6; NLRB v. R. C. Mahon Co., supra
note 5. In many cases, the NLRB's standard has been the employer's "predominant
motive"—Rome Prods. Co., supra note 10; Gerity Whitaker Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 393, 8
L.R.R.M. 275 (1941), aff'd as modified, 137 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318
U.S. 763 (1943) ; Jacob H. Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746, 4 L.R.R.M. 344 (1939).
62 NLRB v. Rapid Bindery Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1960) ; NLRB v. Lassing,
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The Darlington case is not the end of the world for private capital,
as some persons believe. It merely requires the employer to avoid actions
based on anti-union motives. Management's unlimited right to stay
in business or to discontinue operations still exists provided it is not
exercised in such a way as to violate the Labor-Management Relations
Act. As the court of appeals at Richmond" pointed out in enforcing a
Board order directing resumption of a trucking department, the NLRB
normally has no authority to tell an employer how to run his business,
and any order that interferes in the business operations of an employer
is subject to strict limitation; it also made it clear that its order "shall
not be taken to deny the company to abandon the trucking operation
at any time in the future if it deems it best for business reasons to do
so." Similarly the court of appeals in Boston required the NLRB to
reword its order in a subcontract case to indicate that the employer
need only resume the subcontracted operations until it makes a genuine
business judgment, unrelated to the union's activity, to subcontract the
work." Thus Darlington merely stands for the basic proposition that
plant closings and the discharge of employees by employers cannot be
undertaken in order to discourage the employees in the exercise of
their rights under section 7 of the act; nor can such means be used to
interfere and discriminate against persons because of their union mem-
bership or activities. An employer has no more absolute or unlimited
right to close his plant for anti-union motives than he has to fire union
organizers for protected union activities." If the motive for the plant
shutdown (or subcontracting) is to avoid unionization and collective
bargaining, there is an 8(a) (3) problem; if it is economic, there is
an 8(a) (5) problem unless the employer has in fact bargained with the
recognized union." In brief, this entire area requires constant vigilance
by the labor-relations practitioner.
284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960), cert, denied, 366 U.S. 990 (1961). Sec Note, 53 Mich.
L. Rev. 627 (1955). In Phillips v. Burlington Indus., 199 F. Supp. 589 (N.D. Ga. 1961),
the court refused to grant the NLRB's regional director an injunction against liquidation
pending negotiations with a union which had recently won an election. The court held
that an employer who shows economic grounds for discontinuance of operation cannot be
required to bargain concerning the decision to liquidate. This is in line with other de-
cisions upholding the right to liquidate completely where the employer has been motivated
by economic concern and his decision has been held not to be within the purview of the
mandatory provisions of the statute and thus did not require antecedent bargaining.
At the same time, this case sets up the rigid standard of economic loss and seems to
disregard all evidence of anti-union motive (proscribed by the act) which should be
considered as part of a "totality of conduct" in such cases. See Note, 48 Va. L. Rev.
973 (1962).
63 NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1962).
64 NLRB v. Kelly & Picerne, Inc., 298 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1962).
00 In a speech NLRB Chairman McCulloch has stated, "There is a difference in effect
and degree, but little difference in basic principle between the bold discharge of a handful
of union adherents to prevent unionization and the discharge of a whole work force to
prevent unionization." Speech before American Management Association, Mid-Winter
Personnel Conference, Chicago, Ill. (Feb. 15, 1962).
06 Glushein, Plant Removal, N.Y.U. 15th Conf. on Labor 237 (1962).
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